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SOVEREIGNTY AND FREEDOM:
A REPLY TO ROWE
HughJ. McCann
I have defended the view that God's complete sovereignty over the universe,
which requires that he be creatively responsible for our decisions, is compati-
ble with libertarian free will. William Rowe interprets me as holding that this
is entirely owing to God's being timelessly eternal, and argues that God's deci-
sions as creator would still be determining in a way that destroys freedom.
His argument overlooks an important part of my view-an account of creation
according to which God's will as creator does not stand as an independent
determining condition of our own. I try here to clarify that account, and to
show that Rowe's criticisms leave it untouched.
In an earlier article I defended the thesis that God can have complete
sovereignty over the universe despite the fact the humans exercise libertar-
ian freedom. 1 Our decisions and actions are free, I argued, even though
their existence is owing directly to God's creative fiat, because God's action
as creator does not constitute an independent determining condition of
what we do. In "The Problem of Divine Sovereignty and Human
Freedom,"2 William Rowe raises some objections that bring into focus the
issues surrounding this view. I think his criticisms leave my main argu-
ment intact, but they offer the opportunity for some clarifications I hope
will advance the debate.
The position I defend offers several advantages. For the libertarian, it
solves the otherwise intractable problem of bringing free will under the
principle of sufficient reason. Our own reasons for acting as we do are
incomplete; but God's will that we so act is part of his total will for the
world, in which all is ordained to perfect goodness. For biblical exegesis, it
allows a natural reading of passages like Romans 9:15-20 and Philippians
2:12-13, where St. Paul seems clearly to hold both that our behavior is
directed by God and that we are fully responsible it. And for natural theol-
ogy, this view secures the God's complete sovereignty in human affairs.
His providentiallove is expressed fully and with.out frustration in all that
we do, and his omniscience as creator is secure against any defect owing to
our freedom, since our actions are known to hirn through his own will as
to what they will be. But of course the whole thing fails if God's sovereign-
ty and our freedom cannot be reconciled. And although there is ample
precedent for the claim that they can, including the Westminster
Confession which Rowe cites/ there are also reasons for doubt. One on
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which Rowe and I agree concerns whether, on this view, God becomes the
"author of sin." He does not, if by that is meant that our sinful actions
count also as sins or evil doing on God's part. Our actions are still predi-
cated of us on this view, so any sin that they constitute is still ours. God is,
of course, responsible for willing that our sinful actions occur, but that is
not a problem peculiar to the position I defend. The same is true on any
theory that has God knowing, as creator, what world he is creating. And
since God's purposes in willing that we commit acts which are sinful need
not be the same as our purposes in sinning, he may well have good reasons
for creating a sinful world.
Rowe and I disagree on a second and more challenging problem: name-
ly, wh.ether the reconciliatiol1. can be effected at alle The key issue here is
whether it is possible for God's will as creator to be determinative of my
decisions, and yet that those decisions be up to me. If the appeal to God's
will as creator is to provide a sufficient reason for my decisions being as
they are, then God's will has to settle things: my deciding as I do must in
some way be owing to the vision of perfeet good brought to pass by God in
creation. But if this is so, then how can my decisions possibly be up to me?
That would seem impossible, especially if we think of God as being like us:
an agent who exists in time, and whose will for his creatures is achieved by
issuing commands, which in turn cause us to behave as we do. For sup-
pose I decide to vacation in Colorado next sun1mer. On this account, my
decision will have been caused by aseparate act on God's part-a com-
mand, which may very well have occurred long before I was born. And
then I seem to be no more free, in the libertarian sense, then I would be if
my decision were the result of natural causation.
Against this type of objection I had argued, in part, that God is not a
temporal being, so that the creative act on his part that provides for the
existence of my decisions and actions does not antedate them. Rather, my
decisions and actions are willed by God in the single creative act by which,
as I understand things, he puts in place the entire universe, in all of its his-
tory (p. 591). But that is not alle The consideration of eternity was part of a
larger argument that God's action as creator is not a distinct event from our
own exercises of will. Instead, I suggested, the relation of creature to cre-
ator is analogous to that between the content of our own acts of will and
the acts themselves. And I urged that this relation is such that I can have
libertarian freedom, even though the existence of my decisions al1d actions
is directly owing to the exercise of God's will. More on this below, but first
I want to address further the issue of eternity, about which Rowe expresses
misgivings. His concerns are two: whether there can be decisions (on
God's part) that occur at no time whatever, and how timeless decisions can
"determine" decisions that occur in time.4
On the first score, God's role as creator does require that he act, and
since that act belongs to his will it is intention generating. So God does, in
creating the world, decide that it shall be what it is, in every detail. But
that does not require that God, or any act of decision on his part, be "in
time." For time cannot exist except as an aspect of change, and God does
not change. He is eternally engaged in a single act in which all is decided,
simply because in that act all of creation is both placed in being and held
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th.ere through his knowing will. I suspect that there is no legitimate sense
in which this sort of "deciding" even could have temporal features, but in
any case it does not require them. As for whether God's creative activity
could be responsible for tl'le existence of things "in time," I see no difficul-
ty. It would indeed be difficult for a timeless God to create temporal things
if time were as I think many imagine it to be: a sort of pre-existing vessel,
"out there," that God must endeavor to fill up with temporal beings and
their behavior. That would be as though a novelist were presented with a
separate "narrative time," existing prior to any creative activity on her part,
and had somehow to create her cl'laracters so they would exist inside it. I
cannot imagine how such a feat could be accomplished. But that is not
what the novelist does. She creates her own narrative time, and she does
so simply by creating characters and other entities that change. Nothing
more is needed, because time is nothing apart from change. And so it is
with God: by making us creatures who change-who begin and cease to
act, and who interact with other creatures-he creates us in time, simply
because to create such creatures is to create time itself.5 There is no reason
why this could not be done by a timeless being. Indeed, it is just as point-
less to think of God's activity as creator as occurring in temporal relations
with our own acts, as it would be to think a novelist's creative actiOl'lS bear
temporal relations to those of her characters.
But placing God's activity as creator outside time is not alone sufficient
to secure human freedom. There is still the matter of determination to con-
sider, and here Rowe sees the problem of sovereignty reemerging. For if I
only decide wl'lat God timelessly wills that I decide, and if it is truly up to
me what I decide, then in deciding to vacation ll'l Colorado I must in fact be
determining what God's will regarding my decision is to be, rather than
the other way around. But this seems clearly to impugn God's sovereign-
ty, which Rowe rightly predicts would be unacceptable to my position.6
Worse yet, if I do have this kind of authority over God's will, then his will
cannot be arefuge against the objection that libertarian freedom violates
the principle of sufficient reason. For now we are back in a position where
my decision determines all, even God's will. And if tl'lat is so, then the
shortcomings of my own reasons for deciding to vacation in Colorado will
extend also to God's willing that I so decide.7
This second problem is dependent on the first: only if we claim libertari-
an freedom requires that God's will be dependent on ours are we commit-
ted to explaining his decisions in terms of our reasons. I am committed to
no such hopeless project. I hold that we and all of our actions depend upon
God for their existence, not vice versa, so that the perfect good for which he
creates the world counts as the full and final explanation for what we do.
This can be true only if all that we do is finally "up to God." The question is
just whether this state of things entails that our actions are not "up to us," in
the sense libertarian freedom requires. Rowe thinks it does. If I understand
him correctly, he believes that one person's will can be fully efficacious with
respect to al'lother's only if the freedom of the other is destroyed. This,
however, is not obvious when it comes to the relationship between creator
and creature. Certainly, at least, the mere logic of the relationship, which is
what Rowe appeals to,8 is not sufficient to secure such a result. To be sure,
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given the usuallist of God's powers, if he wills that I decide to vacation ll1
Colorado, we may safely infer that I shall so decide. But the mere availabili-
ty of the inference does not destroy my freedom. After all, on most
accounts of God's relationship to the world the reverse inference holds as
weIl. If he is omniscient, any decision of mine must be something God has
willed, simply by choosing to create this world rather than some other. But
although he seems willing to play either side of this equivalence, even Rowe
does not claim God and I are slaves of each other. Logical"determination"
alone, then, will not suffice. There has to be some problen1 about the rela-
tionship I postulated between the events themselves-that is, between God's
willing and mine-that Rowe sees as destroying my freedom. This problem
cannot be a matter of logic, since logical relations do not hold among events.
Rowe does not say what the problem is, nor does he address what I have to
say about human agency, and the relationship between God's will and ours.
Clearly, however, 11e was not convinced. Let me, therefore, try to state more
clearly why I think our choices can owe their existence to God's creative
will, while our freedom is left intact.
In part, the issue 11as to do with what is essential to human agency.
Libertarians are prone to think of agency as apower by which we confer
existence on our own actions. But that cannot be right. If I confer existence
on my act of deciding to vacation in Colorado, I must do so either through
some separate act, or as an aspect of the very act of deciding. If aseparate
act serves as my means then that act, ratl1er than my decision, becomes the
focus of our concerns about agency and freedom, and we are headed for a
vicious regress. But neither can I confer existence on my act of deciding as
an aspect of the act itself. For prior to the aces appearance there is nothing
to do the conferring, and after it appears the conferral is llnnecessary. An
action can groLlnd an aCCOLlnt of its own existence only if existence is an
essential feature of it, and no act-or at least none of ours-exists necessarily.
So whatever agency is, it is not apower of conferring existel1ce on our deci-
sions and actions. I held that there are two things essential to agency (pp.
590-91). The first is intrinsic intentionality, which in decision making is
manifested by tl1e fact that we cannot decide accidentally. Rather, when
we decide we mean to decide, and to decide exactly as we do. The second
essential feature is voluntariness. This is the "up to us" aspect: the fact
that when we make decisions, we feel we are a genuine source of control
and spontaneity in the universe. When I decide to vacation in Colorado, I
see myself as rising above the order of natural causation, and as settling
through my very act of deciding both whether I shall decide, and what the
content of my decision shall be.9
Consider now the relationship between our decisions and actions and
God's will as creator. Given that we cannot confer existence on our
actions, we are left with just three alternatives. The first is that the exis-
tence of our decisions and actions has no accounting whatever. If that is so,
then determinist complaints about the unintelligibility of free will are rein-
stated. In addition, God's sovereignty is irretrievably compromised, and
his omniscience called into question. If there is no explanation whatever
for the occurrence of our decisions and actions, any claim that God could
know as creator what world he is creating is entirely arbitrary. Tl1e second
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alternative is the one determinists prefer: that our decisions and actions
are after all the outcome of natural processes, to be explained by the causal
operation of our motives and beliefs. This secures God's sovereignty an.d
omniscience, since as creator he is responsible for the existence of natural
processes. But it does so only at the expense of giving up libertarianism,
and the theological benefits it has to offer. In particular, we could not
claim that the occurrence of sin in the world has anything to do with the
moral authenticity of free agents. The third and, I think, only acceptable
alternative is that the existence of our decisions and actions has the same
explanation as our own existence: it is to be accounted for in terms of the
free, creative activity of God himself.
Here too, however, there is amistake to be avoided. We tend to think of
God as effecting changes in the world in the same way we do when we
perform volitional movements. That is, we imagine that he issues a kind of
command, which then produces via event causation the mandated effect.
But this cannot be right either. The very idea of a causal nexus is highly
suspect,lO but there is certainly none that joins God's will to the world. If
there were, God would have had to create it. On the present model, that
would require another process of command and causation, and we would
again be facing a regress. The only way to escape the regress is to hold that
God directly creates whatever we take the causal nexus to be. But if God's
creative will can be directly efficacious in this task, then it can also be so in
his creation of us and our actions. There is, then, no nexus here, nor is their
any causal distance between God and either us or our behavior. Rather,
we and all that we do have our being in God, and the first manifestation of
God's creative will regarding our decisions and actions is nothing short of
the acts themselves.
The parallel I tried to draw between our own willing an.d God's (pp. 590-
91) was meant to illustrate the intimacy of this relationship. When I decide
to vacation in Colorado, the direct product of my will is my decision-that is,
the thought tlLat reflects the commitment thereby formed. But there is not
one entity which is my deciding and another which is the decision. Rather,
my thought comes in the mode of deciding, so that the first product of my
will just is the thought which expresses my commitment. I think: I shall
vacation in Colorado this year. Our relationship to God is analogous. As
our thoughts have their being in us, so we and our decisions and actions
have their being in him, his creative will consisting simply in lovingly giv-
ing himself over to being the source of existence for all that iso And as with
Ollr decisions, there is not one event which is God's act of providing for our
existence and another which is our existing. The two constitute tlLe same
ontological reality, differently and equally accurately described. If this
seems obscure, consider again the relationship between the author and her
characters. Their first existence is, of course, in her thoughts. But there is no
independent mental act of tlLe autlLor that gives rise to her characters; they
are born with the very thoughts themselves in which she first conceives
them. The same holds of us in our dependence on God for our existence,
and it holds of our decisions also. Thus, the first manifestation of God's will
in creating me the person who decides to vacation in Colorado is not an
event independent of my decision, but simply my deciding to go there.
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Because tms is so, my decision can owe its existence to the creative will of
God, wlLile at the san1e time being completely free in the libertarian sense.
It does not, of course, result from secondary causes, hence I do indeed tran-
scend the natural causal order in making it. And because my decision is the
first manifestation of God's will in creating me the person who decides as I
do, ms will does not stand as an independent determining factor in my deci-
sion's occurrence. True, I cannot decide in opposition to God's will-and
since he is the foundation of my being, not I of ms, his will is in that sense
determining. But if, in all of my decisions, the first manifestation of God's
will is simply my deciding as I do, then as far as the actual events go all the
determination comes to is that neither God nor I can will as we do and yet
be willing something else. My freedom is in no way curtailed. I am not
acted upon, nor is there in the world or anywhere else any event or set of
conditions apart from my decision that compels it. On the contrary, my
decision to vacation in Colorado remains exactly what it is: adecision. It is
still intrinsically intentional, as all decisions must be, and it is still an exer-
cise of complete spontaneity and control: it is the sole event through which
its own timing and content are settled, and it is predicated solely of me.
God's agency is, of course, involved in its occurrence, for he alone is respon-
sible for the existence of things. But the operation of ms creative activity is
such that my freedom is untouched. Thus, wmle what I decide is complete-
ly up to God as creator, it is completely up to me as agent.
If this is correct, then contrary to the grievously picturesque image
Rowe draws from Reid, no one's hook is in anyone's nose. My hook is not
in God's nose, for he is the creator of heaven and earth, including me and
my actions. And his hook is not in my nose because he is very good at cre-
ating, and hence well able to give existence to agents who freely and vol-
untarily do all that is required for a world that perfectly reflects his good-
ness. That we should find this suggestion difficult is, I think, most likely
owing to either of two misapprehensions. The first is the supposition that
in order to be free, we must somehow confer existence on our own actions.
That would be impossible in any case, as we have seel1, but it is not
required for free will. Libertarian freedom demands only that there be no
independent determining conditions for our deeds, and that we be fully
active in their performance, in the way voluntary intentionality requires. If
the relation between God's will and ours is as I have described it, then both
these requirements are satisfied even though we act only as God wills.
The second source of n1isgiving is a suspicion that our actions cannot be
subject to God's will without our being manipulated by God in the interest
of ends of which we know little or nothing, and wmch need not include our
own final good. But this too is a false supposition. It is true that in acting as
we do we may serve ends we comprehend poorly if at all, and if orthodox
belief is correct it is also true that in serving them we oLlrselves may be lost.
But it hardly follows that we are manipulated. Manipulation requires that
our decisions not be authentically our own, that they be subordinated to
some movement of God's will that is independent of our deciding, and pro-
vides for us a moral character that is ontologically prior to anything we do.
Nothing in the view I have set forth requires that this be the case. On the
contrary: if God's love for each of us is complete, then even though our
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actions may serve additional ends, 11.0ne of tl1.ose el1.ds will be more impor-
tant to him than the destiny that accrues to each of us through our deeds.
The perfeetion of creation is no doubt such that in all we do, our actions
engage perfectly with the rest of the universe, so that aperfect result is
achieved. But that does not prevent God's seeing to it that the actions of
each of us--€ven the lost, if such there be-define an authentie destiny. Bad
authors manipulate their characters; good ones don't have to.
I would be a good dealless than ingenuous to claim everything I have
said here is implicit in the paper Rowe criticizes, al1.d I have to thank hirn
for providing an occasion for me to expand on the relation between our
own agency and God's. I hope I have done so in a way to make the case
more convincing. What is most important, however, is a rather mU1.imal
claim: the mere fact that God's will and mine are so related that each can
be inferred from the other does not destroy my freedom. Its destruction
would require not a logical relationship between propositions, but an onto-
logical one between the corresponding events, such that I am rendered
passive in my decisions and actions. Then, I would cease to be a source of
novelty in the world, and cease to function as a voluntary agent in the for-
mation of my own moral character. Rowe's criticisms do not seem to me
sufficient to establish such a result.
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